<text id=00he0900><title>Prelude to Gotterdammerung: Introduction</title>
<history>US Air Force: Events History</history>
<article><hdr>Prelude to Gotterdammerung: Introduction</hdr><body>
<p>Air power made the invasion of the continent possible. Consider whatever other factors you will, in the final analysis that statement withstands the most reasoned criticism.
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<p>The planners spelled it out in the requirement list for Overlord. Photograph the beaches and inland avenues of the assault. Blast the beach defenses. Destroy the German radars. Weaken the Luftwaffe so that their fighter-bombers could not slow Allied troop movements. Transport and drop one British and two American airborne divisions. Maintain air superiority above the invasion fleet and over the beaches.
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<p>In short, preparations for Overlord included as a necessary item the concentrated, versatile, unique and successful application of air power.
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<p>About that there could be no argument. About the best form in which to apply air power there were many arguments, differences of opinions, and clashes of egos. There was, for example, a major difference of opinion about the best way to immobilize German reserve units that would be moved to the battle front. Eisenhower's team at SHAEF generally favored hitting the Belgian and French railroads, including their bridges, key yards and maintenance facilities. That would, they argued, create a 'railway desert' in northern France. That would prevent, or at least hamper, the German troop movements. These officers wanted to use all available Allied air strength for the job, drawing assets from their assigned tasks against strategic targets deep in Germany. The expected bonus was that the Luftwaffe probably would come up to fight and could be further weakened in the resulting combat.
